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Abstract. We introduce an inquisitive semantics for a language of propo-
sitional logic, where the interpretation of disjunction is the source of in-
quisitiveness. Indicative conditionals and conditional questions are treated
on a par both syntactically and semantically. The semantics comes with
a new logical-pragmatical notion which judges and compares the com-
pliance of responses to an initiative in inquisitive dialogue.
1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce an inquisitive semantics for a language of proposi-
tional logic. In inquisitive semantics, the semantic content of a sentence is not
identiﬁed with its informative content. Sentences are interpreted in such a way
that they can embody both data and issues.
The propositional language for which we deﬁne the semantics is syntactically
hybrid. By this we mean that the syntax of the language does not distinguish
categories of declarative and interrogative sentences.1 The language will also
turn out to be semantically hybrid. By this we mean that some sentences of the
language are both informative and inquisitive. Plain contingent disjunctions will
count as such.2
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   I presented material related to this paper at several occasions in the past two years,
including my Semantics and Pragmatics classes. I thank everyone involved in these
events, especially my students, for helping me to get clearer about things. I owe
special thanks to Floris Roelofsen for his many comments on many earlier drafts;
to Frank Veltman, who insisted on improving the selling points, and initiated joint
cross-linguistic work with Kees Hengeveld, which helped to shape the ﬁrst part of
this paper; to Kata Balogh, who works with me on inquisitive pragmatic matters;
and, last but not least, my close companion in this project, Salvador Mascarenhas,
who discovered the inquisitive behavior of disjunction in the language.
1 You may think that this turns the language into an unnatural one, but that is not
so. There are also hybrid natural languages which lack a formal syntactic distinction
between interrogatives and declaratives.
2 In hybrid natural languages, one of the strategies to express polar questions is to
use disjunction of a sentence and its negation.2
The language will enable us not only to express simple polar questions such
as: “Will Bea go to the party?”, but also conditional questions like: “If Alf goes
to the party, will Bea go as well?”, and alternative questions like: “Will Alf go
to the party, or Bea?”.
The natural use of an inquisitive language lies in dialogues that have the
purpose of raising and resolving issues. We will introduce a logical notion that
judges whether a sentence   is compliant to a sentence  . We look upon   as a
response to an initiative  , and require   to be strictly and obediently related
to  . Compliance is a very demanding notion of dialogue coherence.3
2 Two Possibilities for Disjunction
The main purpose of this paper is to present inquisitive semantics and the log-
ical notions that come with it. Our aim here is not to extensively motivate
the semantics from a linguistic perspective. Nevertheless, we start with a short
discussion of some phenomena concerning disjunction in English. Consider the
simple disjunction in (1), and the interrogative in (2).
(1) Alf or Bea will go to the party.
(2) Will Alf or Bea go to the party?
It is generally acknowledged that the interrogative in (2) has di erent intonation
patterns. On one pattern, the two responses in (3) are the most compliant ones.
(3) a. Yes. Alf or Bea will go to the party.
b. No. Neither of them will go.
Of course, though not answers in this case, these are equally good responses to
the indicative sentence in (1), conﬁrming and rejecting what (1) says, respec-
tively.
On another intonation pattern, perhaps the more common one, (2) is not a
yes/no-question, but has an alternative interpretation, which has two di erent
most compliant responses, one of which is (4).
(4) Bea will go.
There are a couple of things to note. One is that (4), and its alternative, could be
an equally compliant response to (1), but not no matter what. The disjunction in
(1) also has di erent intonation patterns. And the pattern where (4) is a natural
response is not the same as the pattern that most naturally elicits the responses
in (3).
That is not to say that something that amounts to (4) could not be given as
a reaction to (1) when it has the intonation pattern where the responses in (3)
are the most expected ones, but the most ‘appropriate’ way to do it, would then
be by means of (5) rather than (4).
3 In Groenendijk (1999), I deﬁned a similar notion which I called ‘licensing’. I switched
to the term ‘compliance’, because it has a negative ring to it, and thus communicates
more clearly that being non-compliant can easily be a virtue rather than a vice.3
(5) Yes. (In fact,) Bea will go.
First, (1) as such is conﬁrmed, which sort of clears the way to elaborate on this
by stating one of the disjuncts of (1).
Conversely, on the alternative interpretation of (2), it is not impossible to
respond with something that amounts to (3b), denying both alternatives, but a
more compliant way to do it, would be by using (6), rather than (3b).
(6) Well, (actually,) neither of them will go.
If we consider (1) again on the intonation pattern where (4) is ok, (6) (without
the ‘actually’) and (3b) could both be used equally well.
What’s the upshot of these (amateur) observations? It is that there is not that
much of a di erence between the indicative disjunction in (1) and the interrog-
ative in (2). Both have a yes/no-interpretation, and both have an alternative
interpretation, set apart by intonation. And what that suggests is that the al-
ternative interpretation of the disjunction in (1) makes it into something that is
not a plain assertion, that is not just informative, but also inquisitive, in much
the same way as the alternative question interpretation of (2) is.
So, even though English is not syntactically hybrid, it seems to exhibit hybrid
semantic features. Be this as it may, we now turn to our hybrid logical language.
3 Hybrid Propositional Syntax
The syntax of our propositional language is stated in a reasonably standard way.
Deﬁnition 1 (Hybrid Propositional Syntax). Let   be a ﬁnite set of propo-
sitional variables.4 The set of sentences of L  is the smallest set such that:
1. If p    , then p   L 
2.   L 
3. If     L  and     L , then (     )   L 
4. If     L  and     L , then (     )   L 
5. If     L  and     L , then (     )   L 
What is not completely standard about the way the syntax is stated, is that it
appears to intend to be economic in not explicitly introducing negation, whereas
at the same time the deﬁnition does not stop after introducing implication, but
explicitly brings up conjunction and disjunction as well. This suggests that,
unlike in classical propositional logic, conjunction, disjunction and implication
are not interdeﬁnable in the usual way with the aid of negation.5
4 The assumption that the set of atoms is ﬁnite only plays a marginal role in this paper,
but is of importance, e.g., for proving functional completeness. See footnote 14.
5 Like in this syntactic feature, inquisitive logic bears semantical and logical resem-
blances to intuitionistic logic. Inquisitive logic is a so-called intermediate logic. Ex-
cept for one more footnote, I will not address the matter. See Mascarenhas (2008).4
What is also a bit surprising perhaps, is that it is not immediately obvious
from the syntax that questions are there. The last item in the following small
list of notation conventions brings them optionally to the syntactic surface.
Deﬁnition 2 (Notation Conventions).
1. ¬  :=      2.   := ¬  3. !  := ¬¬  4. ?  := (   ¬ )
We will refer to !  as an assertion, and to ?  as a question. Deﬁning these
operations implicates that the law of double negation and the law of the excluded
middle do not generally hold under the inquisitive interpretation of the language.
If you have ever taught an introductory class in logic, you know that translating
from natural language to the logical language at hand, or the other way around,
is not always an easy a air for your students. When you start teaching them
inquisitive propositional logic the next semester, the situation wil not improve.
But here is a piece of pedagogical advice.
Especially when the native language of your students is not syntactically
hybrid — if it is Dutch or English, for example — hammer the following into
their heads: Keep in mind that our logical language is syntactically hybrid, and
has only a single sentential category. A formula of the form ?p is just short
for p  ¬p, and has the same syntactic status, it does not suddenly become an
interrogative sentence, there are none.6
Hence, tell your students not to criticize the logical language for allowing
¬?p as a well-formed sentence because in their mother tongue negating interrog-
atives is out of bound: ¬?p simply stands for ¬(p ¬p), and apart from being a
contradiction, there is nothing wrong with that sentence.
A multi-categorial language like English also has, what one might call, syn-
tactically hybrid constructions, such as conditional interrogatives, where the
antecedent has the same syntactic status as in indicative conditionals, and the
consequent is interrogative. The construction as a whole should rather be char-
acterized as an interrogative.7 In our hybrid logical language, p   q and p   ?q,
where the latter is short for p   (q ¬q), do not have a distinct syntactic status.
This also means that the logical language allows for a formula like ?p   ?q, of
which it is dubious whether it has a ‘direct’ translation in English, in terms of a
conditional with an interrogative antecedent. But, of course, both (p ¬q)   ?q
and (p  ¬p)   (q  ¬q), which are abbreviated by ?p   ?q, do have syntactic
correlates in English.
The examples given sofar mainly pertain to prevent your students from mak-
ing the mistake of literally translating formulas of the form ?  into their native
6 If you are unfortunate enough, and an introductory course in Philosophy of Language
— or any other course where your students were inﬂicted with Speech Acts — went
ahead of your logic course in the curriculum, you have to stress on top of this: We
are doing logical semantics, the question mark in the logical language has nothing
to do with illocutionary force.
7 This is how things are set up syntactically in Velissaratou (2000), where the log-
ical language that deals with conditional questions has two distinctive categories:
interrogatives and declaratives. Our present investigations started from her analysis.5
tongue by mistakingly treating them as the corresponding interrogatives in all
contexts. But in the other direction, translation problems are lurking as well.
Consider our English examples (1) and (2) in the previous Section, a plain
disjunction which your students no doubt translate as p   q, and an alternative
interrogative, which they will be tempted to translate as ?(p   q).
You may forgive them for not noticing the prosodical ambiguity. But even if
so, whether ?(p   q) is the best translation in the hybrid logical language of the
English interrogative in (2) under its alternative interpretation, is not obvious.
?(p   q) is short for p   q  ¬(p   q), which has a direct translation into an
indicative English sentence. Given the discussion in Section 2 concerning the
similarity in responses to (1) and (2), it is doubtful whether p q ¬(p q), and
hence whether ?(p   q), is the most appropriate translation for (2). Perhaps we
might better opt for translating both the indicative in (1) and the interrogative
in (2) as p   q in the hybrid logical language.
In the logical language we can also form !(p q) and ?!(p q), where the former
is short for ¬¬(p q), and the latter can also be written as !(p q) ¬!(p   q), or as
!(p q) ¬(p q), if we may assume that triple negation reduces to single negation.
We have to see whether the inquisitive interpretation is going to corroborate this,
but we might have the suspicion that the prosodic ambiguity we observed for
both (1) and (2), is reﬂected in the logical language in the di erence between
p   q on the one hand, and !(p   q) and ?!(p   q) on the other.
4 Inquisitive Semantics
We state the semantics for a language L  relative to a set W  of suitable possible
worlds for L , where a world w   W  is a valuation function with the set of
propositional variables   as its domain and the two values {1,0} as its range.8
For a declarative language, a standard way to deﬁne the interpretation of
the sentences of the language is by the notion w |=  , which can be read as:
w conﬁrms the information provided by  . This will not su ce to interpret our
hybrid language, where sentences may not only provide information, but may
also raise issues.
The simplest way to deal with this is to evaluate sentences relative to pairs
of worlds, and deﬁne the interpretation of the language in terms of the notion
(w,v) |=  , which is informally characterized as follows:
Agreement Two worlds w and v agree on  ,( w,v) |=   i 
(i) both w and v conﬁrm the information provided by  ; and
(ii) the answer to issues raised by   is the same in w and v.
It wil be clear from this informal description of agreement, that if we consider
(w,w) |=   only the ﬁrst clause applies, and (w,w) |=   simply boils down to:
w conﬁrms the information provided by  . Some further properties are noted in
8 We will often suppress the subscript   on L and W.6
Theorem 2. They follow from the deﬁnition of the inquisitive interpretation of
our hybrid propositional language, which reads as follows.9
Deﬁnition 3 (Inquisitive Semantics). Let     L , and w,v   W .
1. (w,v) |= p i  w(p)=1and v(p) = 1
2. (w,v)  |=  
3. (w,v) |=(      ) i  (w,v) |=   or (w,v) |=  
4. (w,v) |=(      ) i  (w,v) |=   and (w,v) |=  
5. (w,v) |=(      ) i  for all pairs   in {w,v}: if   |=  , then   |=  
The deﬁnition has pretty familiar looks,10 except for the clause for implication,
which quantiﬁes over the four pairs (w,v),(v,w),(v,v), and (v,v). It can easily be
read from the other clauses that to consider (v,w) next to (w,v) is redundant.11
9 There are four di erent situations where we get that (w,v)  |=  :(   ) neither w nor
v conﬁrms the information provided by  ;( • ) w conﬁrms the information provided
by  , but v does not; ( •) the other way around; (• ) both w and v conﬁrm the
information provided by  , but the answer to the issues raised by   is not the same
in w and v. Together with the situation (•• ) where (w,v) |=  , there are ﬁve possible
situations to distinguish. This gives the tools to deﬁne the semantics in terms of a
ﬁve-valued valuation function relativized to two worlds: Vw,v( )   {• •,••,• , •,  }.
We can use truth tables to explicate the meanings of the logical operations.
There is an interesting connection with Nelken & Francez (2001), who — in re-
sponse to the claim made in Groenendijk & Stokhof (1997) that an extensional
semantics of questions is impossible — also interpret a query language in terms of
an ‘extensional’ ﬁve-valued semantics. However, the two sets of values di er in that
for our single value •• , they distinguish the two values ‘true’ and ‘resolved’, and that
our two values • , • are collapsed into a single value ‘unknown’.
As is already obvious from Nelken & Francez (2001) as such, their ‘extensional’
semantics is seriously ﬂawed, and as is explicitly admitted in Nelken & Shan (2006),
who analyze questions in the setting of modal logic, what one needs is a ‘minimally
intensional’ interpretation that needs to take only two worlds into account.
There is also a cryptic remark in Ten Cate and Shan (2007: p. 69) that: “To
test a LoI entailment [Logic of Interrogation, see Groenendijk (1999)], it su ces to
consider structures with only two possible worlds.” It was Balder ten Cate — in his
capacity as an anonymous referee for the submitted abstract of the talk on which
this paper is based — who suggested the semantics relative to pairs of worlds as it is
deﬁned here, as a logically more simple alternative for the update semantics I gave
for the language in the abstract. (See footnote 14.)
10 The clause for disjunction may also look familiar to you if (like Robert van Rooij,
thanks) you have read David Lewis’ paper: ‘Whether’ report (Lewis (1982)). There,
Lewis considers to treat whether A or B clauses as wheth A or wheth B along the
following lines:
|=i,j whether A or B i  |=i,j wheth A or |=i,j wheth B
|=i,j wheth A i  |=i A and |=j A
The notion |=i,j is conceived of as an application of the technique of double indexing.
11 This motivates the use of the notation (w,v) to denote pairs, instead of  w,v .7
We will discuss implication more extensively later, but note that to inspect
whether (w,v) agree on      , we not only check whether if (w,v) agree on
 ,( w,v) agree on   as well. Also in case (w,v) do not agree on  , because w
conﬁrms the information provided by   whereas v does not (or the other way
around), we still keep on checking in that case, whether w (or v) also conﬁrms
the information provided by  .12
Although, as I announced in the introduction, we will see later that the
semantics gives rise to a new logical notion of complicance that rules the use of
the inquisitive language in dialogue, an orthodox notion of entailment in terms
of agreement suggests itself as well.
Deﬁnition 4 (Entailment).
 1,..., n |=   i 
 w,v   W: if (w,v) |=  1 & ...& (w,v) |=  n, then (w,v) |=  
The notion of entailment is well-behaved and has interesting properties. To note
one, from the way in which implication is deﬁned, it immediately follows that
under the inquisitive interpretation of the language the deduction theorem holds.
Theorem 1 (Deduction Theorem).   |=   i  |=      
Logical equivalence of two formulas is deﬁned as usual as mutual entailment.
Deﬁnition 5 (Equivalence).       i    |=   &   |=  
We add two more notions that only pertain to information provided by  .
Deﬁnition 6 (Consistency and Assertiveness).
1.   is consistent i   w   W:(w,w) |=  
2.   is assertoric i   w   W:(w,w)  |=  
With these logical notions in place, we turn to the discussion of the semantics.
4.1 Informativeness and Inquisitiveness
The ﬁrst clause in Deﬁnition 2 implies that a propositional variable p does not
raise an issue. The deﬁnition says that to see whether w and v agree upon p,
it is su cient to see whether w(p)=v(p) = 1. The situation cannot occur that
despite it being the case that (w,w) |= p and (v,v) |= p, still p embodies some
issue to which the answer in w and v is di erent, i.e., that (w,v)  |= p. We have
that (w,v) |= p i  (w,w) |= p and (v,v) |= p.13
12 Compare the discussion in footnote 9 about the four ways in which a pair of worlds
may not agree on a sentence. The clause for implication reads the way it does, to
deal in an appropriate way with these di erent ways in which the antecedent may
not be agreed upon, and to tell us what should be the case for the consequent then.
13 Note that this is just a blunt stipulation in the vein of: “Eines kann der Fall sein oder
nicht der Fall sein und alles ¨ ubrige gleich blieben.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
1.2.1) Under such Logical Atomism it becomes indeed Unsinnig to ask Why? when
atomic sentences are involved. But is it really such nonsense?8
This is di erent for a disjunction like p q. There we can have that (w,w) |=
p   q and (v,v) |= p   q, whereas (w,v)  |= p   q, as can be shown as follows.
Let w be a world where w(p) = 1 & w(q) = 0, and v a world where v(p) = 0 &
v(q) = 1. Then we have that (w,w) |= p and (v,v) |= q, and hence, according to
clause 3 of Deﬁnition 2, both (w,w) |= p   q and (v,v) |= p   q.
At the same time we have that (w,v)  |= p, because v(p) = 0; and (w,v)  |= q,
since w(q) = 0. According to the deﬁnition, this means that (w,v)  |= p   q. So,
we have shown that, unlike in the case of atomic sentences, there are worlds w
and v such that (w,w) |= p   q and (v,v) |= p   q, whereas (w,v)  |= p   q.
Two such worlds w and v do not agree on p   q, because although w and
v both conﬁrm the information provided by p   q, the answer to the issue that
p   q raises, the issue whether p or q, is di erent in w and v, in w the answer is
p, in v it is q.
We have just shown that an atomic sentence p is not inquisitive, and that a
disjunction like p   q is inquisitive, according to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 7 (Inquisitiveness and Informativeness).
1.   is inquisitive i   w,v   W:(w,w) |=   & (v,v) |=   & (w,v)  |=  .
2.   is informative i    is consistent and   is assertoric.
We also deﬁne:
(a)   is hybrid i    is informative and   is inquisitive.
(b)   is contingent i    is consistent, and   is inquisitive or assertoric.
What inquisitiveness of   requires is that there are pairs of worlds that satisfy
the information provided by   (which implies that   is consistent, and hence
contingent), but where the two worlds di er in their answer to an issue raised
by  , which implies that   indeed does raise an issue, otherwise two such worlds
could not be found.
As we have seen, informativeness and inquisitiveness do not exclude each
other, p   q is both informative and inquisitive, and hence semantically hybrid.
Given the way the interpretation of   is deﬁned, it counts as neither infor-
mative, nor inquisitive. I.e.,   is not contingent.The same will hold for  , the
di erence being that whereas   is consistent and not assertoric,   is assertoric
and not consistent.
4.2 Negations and Assertions
Before we turn to negation, we note that on the basis of the informal description
of (w,v) |=   in terms of agreement, we may expect the following to hold, which
indeed it does, given the way the semantics is deﬁned:
Theorem 2 (Symmetry and Reﬂexive Closure of Agreement).
1.  w,v   W:(w,v) |=     (v,w) |=  
2.  w,v   W:(w,v) |=     (w,w) |=   & (v,v) |=  9
The proof runs by induction on the complexity of  .14
From the deﬁnition of inquisitiveness and the last item in Theorem 2, the
following follows immediately.
Proposition 1 (Non-Inquisitiveness).
  is not inquisitive i   w,v   W:(w,v) |=     (w,w) |=   & (v,v) |=  .
Let us now consider ¬  which abbreviates      . Clause 5 of Deﬁnition 2 tells
us that for w and v to agree on      , it should hold for the four pairs (w,v),
(v,w), (w,w), and (v,v), that if such a pair agrees on   it agrees on  . The
interpretation of   tells us that no pair agrees on  . Hence, For w and v to
agree on      , it should hold that (w,v)  |=  ,( v,w)  |=  ,( w,w)  |=  , and
(v,v)  |=  . Given Theorem 2 and the way negation is introduced in the language,
this boils down to:
Proposition 2 (¬Negation). (w,v) |= ¬  i  (w,w)  |=   & (v,v)  |=  .
Two worlds agree on a negation as soon as neither of the two conﬁrms the
information provided by  . As we saw to be the case for atomic sentences,
negations raise no issue. From Propositions 1 and 2 it immediately follows that:
Proposition 3 (Negation). ¬  is not inquisitive.
That negations are never inquisitive, is of course behind the fact that disjunction,
conjunction and implication are not interdeﬁnable in the usual way with the aid
of negation. Disjunction is the indispensable source of inquisitiveness in the
language. And if we were to deﬁne implication and conjunction in terms of
disjunction and negation we do not in general obtain the interpretation now
assigned by the semantics to formulas of these forms.
Since !  is deﬁned as double negation, !  is not inquisitive. And we can write:
Proposition 4 (!Assertion). (w,v) |=!   i  (w,w) |=   & (v,v) |=  
This means that for any formula  ,!   delivers its interpretation in classical logic.
From Propositions 1 and 4 it follows that every non-inquisitive sentence can be
written as an assertion:
Proposition 5 (Assertion). !      i    is not inquisitive.
14 In inquisitive update semantics,astate   for L  is deﬁned as a reﬂexive and sym-
metric relation on a subset of W . In the semantics we recursively deﬁne the e ect
of updating   with  ,  [ ]. The relation with the present semantics is given by:
 [ ]={(w,v)     | (w,v) |=  }. Salvador Mascarenhas proved a Functional Com-
pleteteness Theorem, which says that for any two states   and  
 ,  
        W
2
 :
there is a ﬁnite sequence of sentences  1,..., n   L  such that  [ 1]...[ n]= 
 .
We don’t need the full language to achieve this, {¬, } su ces. Since conjunction
corresponds to sequencing, if we add  , we can move from any state to any of its
substates with a single formula of the language. The assumption we made that   is
ﬁnite, is essential for the functional completeness proof. (See Mascarenhas (2008).)10
Given this fact, we will often refer to non-inquisitive sentences as assertions.
Note that Proposition 5 tells us that the law of triple negation holds. Since
negation is not inquisitive, !¬   ¬ . And iteration of ! is superﬂuous: !!    ! .
Also, since !(p   q) is not inquisitive, it is not equivalent with the hybrid
disjunction p q. The assertion !(p q) raises no issue, !(p q) just embodies the
truthconditional content of disjunction in classical logic.
Remember the discussion in Section 2, where we observed that the English in-
dicative disjunction (1), like its interrogative sister (2), is prosodically ambigu-
ous between a yes/no-interpretation, and an alternative interpretation. As for
the latter, for both (1) and (2), the hybrid disjunction p   q suggests itself as
a proper translation. As for the yes/no-interpretation of the indicative (1), the
assertion !(p   q) seems to cover its meaning. And if we take the disjunction
!(p   q)  ¬(p   q), i.e., ?!(p   q) we get a polar question that suits (2) on its
yes/no-reading. This brings us to questions.
4.3 Questions
Consider the atomic question ?p, which abbreviates p  ¬p. The interpretation
of disjunction tells us that (w,v) |= p  ¬p i  (w,v) |= p or (w,v) |= ¬p, both
worlds agree on p or both worlds agree on ¬p. This means that (w,v) |=? p
i  w(p)=v(p) = 1 or w(p)=v(p) = 0. From this it is clear that ?p is not
informative, and is inquisitive, p ¬p is contingent, it is an inquisitive question.
Given the interpretation of disjunction and the interpretation of negation
given in Proposition 4, we can write:
Proposition 6 (?Questions).
(w,v) |=?   i  (w,v) |=   or (w,w)  |=   & (v,v)  |=  
If we consider (w,w) |=?  , we get that (w,w) |=?   i  (w,w) |=   or (w,w)  |=  ,
which trivially holds, hence  w:(w,w) |=?  . Given how assertiveness is deﬁned,
the ﬁrst item in the next fact holds, from which the second item immediately
follows.
Proposition 7 (Questions).
1. ?  is not assertoric.
2. ?      i    is not assertoric.
Given this fact, we will often refer to non-assertoric sentences as questions. (Note
that since   is neither assertoric nor inquisitive, it counts both as an uninforma-
tive, non-assertoric assertion, and as a non-contingent, non-inquisitive question.)
The last item in Proposition 7 implies that iteration of ? is superﬂuous:
??    ? . The fact that iteration of both ! and ? are superﬂuous, makes it easy
to state things in general about assertions and questions.11
4.4 Conditionals: Divide and Conquer
The two speciﬁc cases of conditionals with a question, and conditionals with an
assertion as consequent, behave more standardly than the clause for implication
in Deﬁnition 2 might suggest.
Proposition 8 (Conditional Questions and Conditional Assertions).
1. (w,v) |=     ?  i  (w,v) |=     (w,v) |=?  
2. (w,v) |=     !  i  (w,w) |=       and (v,v) |=      
Clause 5 in Deﬁnition 2 requires for (w,v) |=       that it holds for each of the
pairs   we can form from w and v, i.e., (w,v), (v,w), (w,w), and (v,v) that: if
  |=  , then   |=  . Given symmetry of agreement (Theorem 2), among those
four, we can dismiss (v,w).
Furthermore, since ?  is not assertoric, i.e.,  w:(w,w) |=?  , in evaluating
    ? , we can dismiss the two identity pairs as well. This also means that if
  is not assertoric, then neither is      .
Conversely, since !  is not inquisitive, i.e., (w,v) |=   i  (w,w) |=   &
(v,v) |=   (Proposition 1), in evaluating     ! , we only have to consider the
two identity pairs. This also means that if   is not inquisitive,       is not
inquisitive either, and behaves like classical material implication:
Proposition 9 (Non-Inquisitive Conditionals).     !    !(     )
So, we have seen how the two speciﬁc cases of conditionals with non-inquisitive
and non-assertoric consequents behave more standardly than the clause for im-
plication in Deﬁnition 2 might suggest. But we can actually show that any con-
ditional reduces to a combination of these two simple cases.
The following fact tells us that every sentence   can be divided in a theme ? 
and a rheme ! .
Proposition 10 (Division).     ?    ! 
From this it immediately follows that every conditional       can be written
as     (?    ! ). Next, we use the following distribution fact.
Proposition 11 (Distribution 1).     (     )   (     )   (     )
This allows us to rewrite the conditional     (?  ! ) as the conjunction of con-
ditionals (    ? ) (    ! ). Finally, applying the equivalence in Proposition 9
to the second conjunct, we arrive at the following fact.
Proposition 12 (Conditional Division).         (    ? )   !(     )
Any conditional can be rewritten as the conjunction of a conditional question
and a classical material implication.15
15 Actually, we may take this to mean that the theme of a plain conditional, the ques-
tion on the background, is the corresponding conditional question (rather than the12
4.5 Disjunctive Antecedents
Consider the simplest example p   ?q of a conditional question. We get that
(w,v) |= p   ?q i  w(p)=v(p)=1  w(q)=v(q). I.e., either w(p)=v(p)=
1   w(q)=v(q) = 1 or v(p)=w(p)=1  w(q)=v(q) = 0. Which means that
p   ?q is equivalent with the disjunction (p   q)   (p  ¬q). This is a special
instance of the following equivalence:16
Theorem 3 (Mascarenhas Theorem). !    (   )   (!     ) (!     )
This equivalence does not hold generally also in case of inquisitive antecedents.
The following pair of examples is a case in point: (p   q)   ?r    !(p   q)   ?r.
With the Mascarenhas Equivalence, !(p   q)   ?r corresponds to a disjunction
of two assertions: ((p q)   r) ((p q)  ¬r). We will show that (p q)   ?r
corresponds to a longer disjunction of four assertions.
First we note another distribution fact.
Proposition 13 (Distribution 2). (     )       (     )   (     )
This means that (p   q)   ?r is equivalent to (p   ?r)   (q   ?r), which is
Mascarenhas-equivalent to ((p   r) (p  ¬r)) ((q   r) (q  ¬r)), to which
we apply the (last) distribution fact:
Proposition 14 (Distribution 3).
(     )   (     )   (     )   (     )   (     )   (     )
This gives us four disjuncts, two of which are (p   r)   (q   r) and (p  
¬r) (q  ¬r), which by Proposition 13 reduce to the ﬁrst two of the following
four disjuncts, which together are equivalent with (p   q)   ?r:
((p   q)   r)   ((p   q)  ¬r)   ((p   r)   (q  ¬r))   ((p  ¬r)   (q   r)).
What we have arrived at, is that there are, as we will call them, four possibilities
for the sentence (p   q)   ?r. In this case, since the sentence is an inquisitive
question, the four possibilities correspond to four possible answers.17
corresponding questioned conditional). Thus, inquisitive semantics may be taken to
give a logical explanation for the idea ventured in the ﬁrst sentence of Ramsey’s
famous footnote, known as the Ramsey Test: (Ramsey (1931))
If two people are arguing “If p will q?” and are both in doubt as to p, they are
adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis
about q; so that in a sense “If p,q” and “If p,¬q” are contradictories.
These two ‘contradictories’ are the two answers to the conditional question that we
just found to be the theme of a conditional. See also Grice’s paper on ‘Indicative
Conditionals’ in Grice (1989).
16 The hard part of this equivalence, from left to right (and with ¬  instead of ! ),
is known as the Kreisel-Putnam Axiom and corresponds to an admissible rule in
intuitionistic propositional logic. Salvador Mascarenhas has proved that it is also
valid in inquisitive propositional logic. This result is crucial in obtaining a disjunctive
normal form. (See footnote 18.)
17 We discovered this nice feature of the semantics by surprise. Tikitu (Samson) de
Jager programmed the semantics. The program spits out the possibilities (see below)13
4.6 Possibilities
Given the properties of (w,v) |=  , as stated in Theorem 2, the relation between
worlds of ‘to agree on a sentence  ’, corresponds to a set of sets of worlds.
Deﬁnition 8 (Possibilities). Let     L . P is a possibility for   in W  i 
1. P   W  &  w,v   P:(w,v) |=  ; and
2.  P    W : if P   P  &  w,v   P :(w,v) |=  , then P  = P.
A possibility for a sentence   is a largest set P of worlds (a proposition), such
that for any two worlds w,v   P:w and v agree on  .18
A sentence   is inquisitive i  there is more than one possibility for  ;   is
not inquisitive i  there is a single possibility for  . The set of possibilities for  
in W is { }. The set of possibilities for   is {W}. A sentence   is informative
i  the union of the set of possibilities for   is not empty and is not equal to W.
If there is more than one possibility for a sentence  , then each possibility
corresponds to a proposition that fully resolves the issue raised by  . Unions of
(some but not all) possibilities for   correspond to propositions that partially
resolve the issue raised by  .
The possibilities for a sentence may or may not mutually exclude each other.
E.g., in the cases of p ¬p and ?p ?q they do, in the cases of p q and p   ?q
they don’t. We call sentences which have no overlapping possibilities classical
sentences.19
Deﬁnition 9 (Classical Sentences).
  is classical i  for any two possibilities P  = P  for   in W:P   P  =  .
All non-inquisitive sentences, all assertions !  are classical. If ?  is a classical
question, then the set of its possibilities forms a partition of W.
For classical sentences   it holds that if P is a possibility for  , then for all
w   P, there is no other possibility P  for   such that w   P . This is a bit
weaker:
that a formula gives rise to. This is particularly helpful for formulas with more
than two propositional variables, which are hard to picture. We ran the program on
(p q)   ?r, expecting to get out the two possibilities for !(p   q)   ?r. Panic struck
when the program predicted four possibilities. But after analyzing what came out,
the program — and the semantics — turned out to be right. There is a reading of
the question: “If Alf or Bea goes to the party, will Chris go as well?”, that has the
four possible answers that Tikitu’s program came up with.
18 Salvador Mascarenhas has proved that the set of possibilities for a sentence   can
be syntactically characterized as a disjunction of assertions, where each assertion
characterizes a possibility. Any sentence can be transformed into its Inquisitive Dis-
junctive Normal Form, which has this property. (Mascarenhas (2008))
19 Christopher Brumwell has proved that a language which has {¬, ,?} as its only
basic operators, where ¬ and ? are interpreted as indicated in Proposition 2 and 6,
is functionally complete (see footnote 14) relative to all equivalences relations on
subsets of the set of worlds. So, this language characterizes the classical fragment of
the full language.14
Deﬁnition 10 (Semi-Classical Sentences).
  is semi-classical i  for every possibility P for   in W, there is some world
w   P such that for no possibility P   = P for   in W:w   P .
We could say that in case of a semi-classical sentence, the possibilities for that
sentence are truly alternatives, in the sense that each of them has a unique part
not shared by any of the other possibilities. Although not classical, p   q and
p   ?q are semi-classical.
An example of a sentence that is not semi-classical, is the disjunction of ques-
tions ?p   ?q. It is a choice-question. In responding to ?p   ?q one can choose
between answering ?p and ?q. There are four possibilities for ?p   ?q that cor-
respond to the two answers to ?p and the two answers to ?q. Any world in the
possibility that p is either contained in the possibility that q or in the possibility
hat ¬q, and similarly for the other three possibilities.20
5 Inquisitive Logic
If we ask ourselves what the natural purpose of an inquisitive language is, the
obvious answer is: to raise and resolve issues; a purpose best suited in dialogue.
Then a natural task for a logic that comes with inquisitive semantics is to address
moves in a dialogue concerned with cooperatively raising and resolving issues.
Following the lead of the ‘normative’ status of the logical notion of entailment
in judging validity of argumentation, we can take inquisitive logical notions to
judge ‘correctness’, or ‘coherence’, or ‘compliance’ of a response to an initiative
in a cooperative inquisitive dialogue.
Here we can draw from general insights in dialogue studies.21 Two fundamen-
tal dialogue coherence relations for a response to an initiative are the following:
Two Dialogue Coherence Relations
(i) Answer an issue raised by an initiative (informative relation); or
(ii) Replace the issue by an easier to answer subissue (inquisitive relation).
The inquisitive option is second choice, a cooperative responder takes recourse to
it only if he lacks the information for even a partial fulﬁlment of the ﬁrst option.
And note that if the initiative is a question, we may assume that the initiator
certainly has no full answer to it, but she just may have a bit of a partial answer
to her own question. Hence, it can make sense for the responder to ask a counter
question, if only because when that bit of the issue were resolved, it may become
possible for him to provide a full(er) answer to the initial question.22
20 It has been debated whether disjunctions of questions exist in natural language, for
example by Szabolcsi (1997). But, surely, there is nothing wrong with: “Answer 3 of
the following 5 questions: ...”. This easily translates in our hybrid logical language
as a long disjunction,of which each disjunct is a conjunction of 3 of the 5 questions.
21 See, e.g., Asher & Lascarides (1998), Hulstijn (2000), and Roberts (1996).
22 For similar reasons, it may also be sensible not to respond with a subissue, but with
an objectively speaking unrelated question, which subjectively, for the responder, is
related to the issue posed by the initiator.15
Of course, the less inquisitive such a counter question is, the better the
chances are that this bit of the original bigger issue, turns out not to be an
issue for the initiator.
If we go from here, then one can take it to be the case, that the general direction
an inquisitive dialogue strives for, is to move from less informed to more informed
situations, and from more inquisitive to less inquisitive situations.
If we look at entailment from this perspective, we see that more informative-
ness of   as compared to   is measured by   |=  , whereas less inquisitiveness
of   as compared to   runs in the opposite direction, and is measured by   |=  .
It is not too di cult to design a logical relation that measures informativeness
and inquisitiveness in these opposite direction in one go. We call it homogeneity.
Deﬁnition 11 (Homogeneity).   is at least as homogeneous as  ,       i 
1. For all w   W: if (w,w) |=  , then (w,w) |=  , and
2. For all w,v   W: if (w,w) |=   & (v,v) |=   & (w,v)  |=  , then (w,v)  |=  .
The second clause holds trivially for assertions, since the antecedent can never
be the case. The ﬁrst clause holds trivially for questions. The most essential
features of homogeneity, and its hybrid relation to entailment, are listed below:
Proposition 15 (Homogeneity).
1. If      , then !  |=!  
2. !    !  i  !  |=!  
3. If !    ! , then       i  ?  |=?  
4. ?    ?  i  ?  |=?  
5. !    ? 
6.    
7.   ? 
Although homogeneity gives the general direction an inquisitive dialogue strives
for, as is particularly clear from the fact that any assertion is at least as homoge-
neous as any question (item 5 in the list), we need some more speciﬁc directions
that tell us, e.g., which assertions are proper responses to which questions. The
logical notion of relatedness, deﬁned in terms of possibilities, does that.
Deﬁnition 12 (Relatedness).   is related to  ,       i 
every possibility for   is the union of a subset of the set of possibilities for  
Relatedness is deﬁned generally for all kinds of sentences, but if   is an assertion,
for which there is only a single possibility P, relatedness of   to   requires that
P is the union of a subset of the set of possibilities for  , which, in case  
is inquisitive, is as close as you can logically expect to get, in characterizing
partially resolving the issue raised by an initiative  .
By homogeneity we can measure whether the information contained in one
sentence more fully resolves an issue, than the information contained in another16
sentence. Were it not for the borderline case of non-contingent  , which is more
homogeneous than any contingent sentence, and is also related to every sentence,
we could equate the most homogeneous related responses to an inquisitive ini-
tiative   with those sentences   that completely resolve the issue   raises.
In other words, under the general constraint of contingency of a response,
relatedness, combined with homogeneity, tells us how well a sentence does in
resolving an issue. This concerns the informative dialogue coherence relation.
Concerning the inquisitive dialogue coherence relation, we get a similar story.
First of all, if a question ?  is related to and at least as homogeneous as a question
? , it is indeed guaranteed that ?  is at least as easy to answer as ? .23
Secondly, by homogeneity we can measure whether one question is a more
minimal subissue of some issue, than another question is. Were it not for the
borderline case of non-contingent  , which is the most homogeneous ‘question’,
and is also related to every question, we could equate the most homogeneous
related questions to some question  ? with the minimal subquestions of  ?.
In other words, under the general constraint tof contingency of a response,
relatedness, combined with homogeneity, tells us how well a question does in
replacing an issue by an easier to answer subissue. This concerns the inquisitive
dialogue coherence relation.
We put our ﬁndings together in the following deﬁnition of compliance that
deals with both dialogue coherence relations.
Deﬁnition 13 (Compliance).   is a compliant response to   i 
1.   is contingent; and
2.   is related to  ; and
3.   is at least as homogeneous as  .
This qualitative notion of compliance embodies a comparative quantitative no-
tion as well: among contingent sentences which are related to an initiative, homo-
23 Relatedness by itself does not in general achieve this. A case in point is that ?p is
related to ?p   ?q, where at the same time ?p is more inquisitive, i.e., less homoge-
neous, than ?p   ?q:? p   ?q   ?p, and hence ?p |=? p   ?q. The following fact says
that when we restrict ourselves to semi-classical sentences, relatedness of   to   as
such, already guarantees that   is not more inquisitive than  .
For semi-classical   and  : if       then      
For classical sentences, we can characterize relatedness in terms of entailment.
For classical   and  :       i    |=?  
In the logic of interrogation of Groenendijk (1999), which deals with classical sen-
tences only, a similar fact appears concerning its notion of licensing, which corre-
sponds to the present notion of relatedness. The fact was used in ten Cate & Shan
(2007) in axiomatizating the logic. For non-classical   and   this fact does not al-
ways hold. For example, we have that p   q   p   ?q, but p   ?q  |= ?(p   q).
Instead we have that ?(p   q) |= p   ?q, and p   ?q    ?(p   q).17
geneity prefers more informative sentences, and among two equally informative
sentences, it prefers less inquisitive sentences.24 These are the borderline cases:
Proposition 16 (Ultimate Compliance). Let   be a contingent initiative.
1.   is a least compliant response to   i    is equivalent to  .
2.   is a most compliant response to   i  there is a single possibilty P for  ,
such that P is a possibility for   as well.
3. If   is a question,   is a most compliant non-informative response to   i 
  is a polar subquestion of  .
Note that in case the initiative is a polar question, the most compliant non-
informative responses coincide with the least compliant responses. If the respon-
der has no answer to a polar question, there is no signiﬁcant move to make.
Similarly, in case the initiative is a contingent assertion, the least and most
compliant responses coincide: repeating the initiative, at most rephrasing it a
bit, is the only compliant move to make.
This is why we characterized compliance informally as strict and obedient
relatedness. Compliance as such does not allow for critical responses. Logically
speaking, it is just a small step to allow for critical responses: also permit com-
pliance to the theme ?  of an initiative  . Emotionally, though, say for a parent
with a maturing child, this may be a big step. But that’s another story.
6 Conclusion: Inquisitive Pragmatics
It will not have escaped your attention that the way the logical notion of compli-
ance is deﬁned bears resemblances to the Gricean Cooperation Principle and its
Maxims of Quality, Relation and Quantity. This may give rise to the expectation
that implicatures are around the corner.
Consider the example of a hybrid disjunction p q as an initiative. There are,
up to equivalence, only two most compliant responses: p and q. In particular, the
more homogeneous sentence p   q is blocked, because it is not related to p   q.
Apparently, according to the initiator, it does not count.
How can that be? We have taken it to be the case that a cooperative dialogue
strives for more homogeneous situations. In principle, the initiator should be
interested in obtaining the information whether p   q on top of the information
that p (or q). By blocking p   q as a response, the initiator suggests that: not
both p and q. And by responding with just p to p   q, the responder signals
that he goes along with that suggestion. Hence, his answer p implicates that ¬q.
Cooperatively, initiator and responder have agreed upon exclusive disjunction.
Of course, the responder may have reasons for not following the exclusiveness
suggestion made by the initiator, just as he may have reasons not to accept the
24 There is a clearcut syntactic connection between an initiative and compliant re-
sponses, and comparison thereof, when we consider inquisitive disjunctive normal
forms (see footnote 18): cut o , and/or take the assertive closure of disjuncts, the
more the better, as long as one remains.18
informative content, which excludes that neither p nor q. In both cases, the
responder opts for not being compliant. In such situations, the appropriate way
to do this, is not to bluntly reject the information provided, with: “Neither p
nor q!”; or to protest against the suggestion being made with: “Both p and q!”.
Compliant non-compliant responses are rather: “Well, actually, neither p nor q”;
and: “Well, in fact, both p and q.”, thus explicitly signalling awareness of the
non-compliance of one’s response. (See also the examples in Section 2.)
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